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Abstract
A descriptive norm is a behavioral rule that individuals follow when
their empirical expectations of others following the same rule are met. We
aim to provide an account of the emergence of descriptive norms by first
looking at a simple case, that of the standing ovation. We examine the
structure of a standing ovation, and show it can be generalized to describe
the emergence of a wide range of descriptive norms.
Descriptive norms hide in plain sight. While we may not always think of them,
they govern many of our day to day interactions: they help guide our fashion
choices, our table manners, the colors we wear at weddings, and any number
of other small features of our social interactions. This governance can become
evident when we travel: many of our small-scale behaviors and interactions are
culturally contingent. Americans typically greet each other with handshakes.
Many continental Europeans greet each other with kisses to the cheek – but
the number varies between countries. Standards for personal space vary across
cultures. It would be difficult to argue that any one of these practices is ‘right’
– descriptive norms do not carry the normative weight of social or moral norms
– but we all follow the norms from our own cultural context, and imitate the
behavior of our peers. While this may provide a satisfactory account of how
descriptive norms operate, it does not tell us about how they came to be. What
is it about a given norm that caused everyone to start following it?
To begin to answer this question, we will turn to a simple case, that of the
standing ovation. Standing ovations, like many other descriptive norms, are
the result of spontaneous coordination of individual choices across many indi-
viduals. They have become a common practice after many live performances,
even though there is no pre-arranged plan or even any formal coordination. All
individuals can do is decide whether or not they wish to stand, based on their
own preferences, and what they see others doing around them (Miller and Page
2004). Put slightly more formally, most agents have preferences about whether
or not they like to stand up, which depend on the quality of the concert. They
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know that standing to clap is a common option after a performance, and they
have (conditional) preferences for standing up if the other agents stand up, too.
This exemplifies a descriptive norm: the agents know that there is a behavioral
pattern (standing to clap) that applies to the situation they are in, and they
prefer to conform with the group (Bicchieri 2006, 31-32). In other words, their
behavior is not only determined by unconditional preferences for certain actions,
but also by their desire to conditionally conform to the behavior of a sufficiently
large group.
Standing ovations are a useful stand-in for describing societal transitions to a
wide variety of descriptive norms. That is, there is a status quo behavior that
can be upended by an alternative. For example, fashion often works in this
way. Prior to mini skirts, women wore longer-length skirts, and upon their
introduction, the population largely shifted to a mini-skirt norm. Movements in
popular music also follow a similar pattern: teenagers largely coalesce around a
few bands or a particular kind of music for a few years, before giving way to a
new set of music. Calling etiquette has similarly shifted as email has become a
more common form of communication. What we find in all of these cases is a
status quo that, without any central coordination, loses out to a new behavioral
rule. By focusing on a standing ovation model as an exemplar of this wider set
of phenomena, we can avoid the problem of getting lost in small case-specific
details, and instead try and identify the key features of individual decision-
making that can affect the emergence of a norm. Thus, we aim to examine how
ovations might arise, and in doing so, come to a more general account of the
emergence of descriptive norms in a population.
To provide for this more general account, we investigate several features of
individual decisions, such as a desire to conform, one’s knowledge of what others
are doing, and one’s own preferences. These elements can affect the emergence
of a descriptive norm in a group and influence some aspects of the processes,
such as whether the group converges on a single behavior, and if it does, how
quickly this happens. Our model allows us to carefully explore the key aspects
of individual decision making that drive these collective behaviors.
One additional fact that we wanted to take into consideration was that though
descriptive norms can be built out of many small decisions, they do not always
emerge. While many of our day to day activities are governed by norms, not all
of them are. Plenty of our actions are different. We do not all walk in lock-step.
Further, many of our seemingly coordinated actions can be simply described
as behavioral regularities – agents act purely in accordance with their intrinsic
preferences, which just happen to align with others’. Descriptive norms, on the
other hand, arise when the desire to conform to the behavior of others over-
whelms one’s initial preferences. Our model helps us to explore the contingent
nature of many descriptive norms. What this model suggests is that it is pos-
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sible that some descriptive norms become descriptive norms for no particular
reason other than the peculiarities of the individuals in the population.
In this paper we explore four main models:
1. In the first model, the baseline, we build a model for a standing ovation,
which considers an individual’s decision about whether she will stand to be
a combination of her personal unconditional preference and her tendencies
to choose to conform to the behavior of others.
2. In the second model, the inertia model, we introduce two new features
of individual decision-making: first, a tendency of individuals to become
increasingly set in their ways as time goes on, and second, a more nuanced
model of social contagion, to better match how bandwagon effects occur.
3. In the third model, the endogenous social sensitivity model, we treat one’s
sensitivity to the behavior of others not as something separate from one’s
individual preferences, but as dependent on them.
4. In the fourth model, the symmetric model, we consider a reversible case,
where each agent can decide whether to stand up or to sit down in any
round. We assume that the population is made by two agent-types with
opposite preferences. This setting allows us to compare the emergence of
descriptive norms, where all individuals set on the same action regardless
of their own preferences, and behavioral regularities, where all individuals
continue to follow their intrinsic preferences despite other peoples’ actions.
Each model helps us learn more about the nature of social decision-making. The
first three models explore the robustness of the standing ovation approach as
an explanation of directed norm emergence. These three models together allow
a more nuanced view of social effects on individual decision making than just
the baseline standing ovation model would allow. By examining more decision
procedures, we are able to better describe a larger class of directed norm tran-
sitions than we would otherwise be able to. Being able to look at information
asymmetries between agents further allows us to examine the effects of social
hierarchies on norm emergence. The fourth model that we consider widens the
scope of our investigation into norm emergence by examining a symmetric case
that allows for norm emergence in either direction, or none at all. Here we are
able to more fully investigate the conditions for when norms do not emerge, since
the model allows us compare behavioral regularities from descriptive norms, as
we can directly inspect agent preferences. Unlike Lewis’ approach to the analy-
sis of conventions, according to which conventions are solutions to coordination
games where ‘each wants to conform conditionally upon conformity by others’
(Lewis 1969), we focus on the decisions of agents who do not reason about
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other agents’ expectations, and on norms that themselves have no intrinsic co-
ordination advantages. We are interested in studying the dynamics created by
individuals who have both intrinsic preferences to act and some interest in con-
formity. This allows us to focus on a wider range of more common descriptive
norms, many of which end up having large cultural variation. While much of
this analysis could apply to Lewis-conventions, we examine a less structured en-
vironment. In the family of models we consider, not only do we allow for agents
to have interests beyond pure coordination, we allow for asymmetries between
agents across several dimensions, and consider both complete and incomplete
information conditions.
Together, these models provide a more general account of descriptive norm
emergence than has been seen so far in the existing literature. First, by focus-
ing on norms that have no inherent differences in utility, we can focus on the
large class of under-studied everyday norms, such as norms of personal space,
etiquette, dress, eye contact, and other small-bore issues. These norms when
put together help explain a large portion of our social behavior, even if any
individual norm has only a small effect. Second, by introducing information
asymmetries between agents, we begin an analysis of the effects of social hierar-
chies on norm dynamics. Third, by splitting our study of norms into the directed
and bidirectional cases, we can then study the differences between behavioral
regularities and descriptive norms, which can otherwise get lumped together in
other literature.
1 The Baseline Model
1.1 Model Description
Let there be M people in the audience of a theater play. The variable s
(n)
i
with i = 1, . . . ,M indicates whether person i is sitting (s
(n)
i = 0) or standing
(s
(n)
i = 1) at time-step (“round”) n = 0, 1, . . . . Time is discretized and at n = 0,
everybody is seated. Everybody who is not yet standing “updates” her position
in each round. Our central idea is that whether or not a person stands up
depends on her effective propensity to do so. The effective propensity of person
i is the convex combination of two factors:
1. An intrinsic preference qi to stand up. This represents an individual’s
preference to stand up or not, independently of what other people are
doing.
2. An extrinsic propensity to stand up. This factor takes into account what
other people in the audience are doing. So whether or not someone stands
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up in round n will depend on how many people S(n−1) :=
∑M
i=1 s
(n−1)
i
were standing up at round n− 1. Note that S(0) = 0.
Combining these two factors, we arrive at the following expression for the effec-
tive propensity to stand up in round n:
P
(n)
i = σi
(
S(n−1)
M
)
+ (1− σi) qi (1)
We see that the variable σi ∈ (0, 1) measures how much person i takes the
extrinsic propensity, i.e. social considerations into account. It determines the
relative weight of intrinsic and extrinsic propensity. Therefore, we say that σi
measures the social sensitivity of person i. Let’s call the model in equation (1)
the baseline model. In each round n, everybody who is still sitting considers her
propensity P
(n)
i and then decides, by a chance mechanism, whether or not to
stand up.
Under the conditions of this model, the number of standing people will converge
to 1, as n goes to infinity.1 But in practice, only a finite number of rounds will
be played, and if the σi’s are sufficiently small, it may well be the case that not
everyone stands up. In order to better study this model, let us now turn to a
numerical analysis of the model.
1.2 Numerical Analysis
Our model (and its extensions, which we will discuss below) suggests a variety
of numerical studies. In order to best investigate these cases, we turn to instan-
tiating the models as agent-based computer simulations. The simulations were
written in Netlogo 4.0.4.
In the agent-based simulations, 1089 agents are seated in a 33 × 33 grid, all
facing the same direction, in order to represent individuals seated in a theater.
As is standard in agent-based models, time is broken up into discrete steps. In
each step of the simulation, seated agents independently assess whether or not
they should stand. Their decision procedure is simply an instantiation of the
equation previously described. As was noted before, agents who are standing
remain standing in perpetuity. Each simulation is run until either every agent
is standing, or 1000 steps have passed. If each step represents one second of
actual time, 1000 steps represents nearly 17 minutes, which we consider to be
the extreme upper end of how long a standing ovation might last. For the
purpose of analysis, all simulations were repeated 100 times.
1This is easily demonstrated for any single agent i as follows: In each round k, P
(k)
i ≥
(1− σi) qi. Thus, the probability that the agent will remain seated after n rounds is lesser or
equal than (1− (1− σi) qi)n → 0. Thus, the agent will eventually stand up with probability
one. Since the group is finite, the group will almost surely stand up as well.
5
1.2.1 Complete Information
In our first set of simulations, we examined agents who could see the entire
audience. Their position in the theater had no effect on what information was
available to them. As such, agents all worked from precisely the same informa-
tion about what others in the audience were doing.
As we have previously noted, the baseline model guarantees convergence on a
standing ovation. So instead of discussing whether or not a standing ovation
occurs, we study the speed of convergence. In particular, we are interested in
determining how the parameters specified in the baseline model affect conver-
gence times.2 To examine these effects, we must consider the agents’ intrinsic
propensity to stand up, and the agents’ social sensitivity in turn. We will first
examine the effects of the intrinsic propensity on ovation convergence.
In our studies of the intrinsic propensity we held social sensitivity σi fixed at
various values (figure 1) so we could examine how the increase of the intrinsic
propensity by itself affected rates of norm convergence. In general we saw that,
as the intrinsic propensity increases, the time of convergence decreases. This is,
of course, exactly what we expect from the mathematics of the model (1).
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Figure 1: The effect of intrinsic preference on time to convergence
We found a similar story with an examination of the social sensitivity (figure
2). As before, what we saw is that as the social sensitivity increases, the time
of convergence decreases. However, the speed of convergence diminishes at a
fairly different rate when the social sensitivity is combined with a very low
value of intrinsic propensity (qi=0.1). This makes perfect sense: when both
2For ease of analysis, we report on those models in which all agents have the same parameter
values. We examined mixed populations, but did not find differences that merited separate
presentation.
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the intrinsic propensity and the social sensitivity are very low, it takes long
time until everyone is standing. It is enough that the social sensitivity slightly
increases for the initial deadlock to be resolved.
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Figure 2: The effect of social sensitivity on time to convergence
We found that both parameters make a notable difference: each can cause
the convergence rate to be significantly faster. However, the manipulation of
social sensitivity appears to diminish convergence time more pronouncedly. This
makes also sense: sensitivity to one’s peers will accelerate any bandwagon effect
as the population moves towards convergence.
1.2.2 Incomplete Information
In our second set of simulations, we examined agents who were limited in how
much of the audience they could see. In particular, agents could only see the
agents in front of them within their range of vision. In this model, agents
could see all the way to the front of the theater, but only within a cone of 30
degrees. Thus, agents could not see anyone behind them, nor anyone outside
of this limited scope of vision in front of them. This extension assigns different
degrees of influence to the agents: those in the front rows are highly influential as
their choices are taken into account by agents seated towards the rear, whereas
the latter’s choices affect few other agents. Notably, we obtain an asymmetry
between information and influence: agents at the front can only see the behavior
of a narrow peer group (or they don’t care about the rest), while those at the
rear have complete insight. This extension is therefore a particularly intuitive
way to model mutual impact in social hierarchies.
To describe this more formally, consider an audience of R rows with L seats
in each row. Now everybody takes only a fraction of the whole audience into
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account when calculating the extrinsic propensity, for example the cone of people
in front of the person. Then, clearly, the behavior of the people in the first row
will be more important than the behavior of those in the last row. After all,
almost everybody will look at what the people in the first row are doing. In this
case, the ratio S(n−1)/M is to be replaced by the expression
1
|Mi|
∑
j∈Mi
s
(n−1)
j (2)
Here Mi is the group of people person i can observe.3
As with our study of model of complete information, we first held the social
sensitivity parameter fixed at discrete values to study the effects of the intrinsic
propensity’s increase (Figure 3). We found that the model with incomplete
information behaved very similarly to the complete information case, though
convergence times were notably slower at low values of qi. Where in the complete
information case, when qi = 0.1 average time to convergence was 20.25, in the
case of incomplete information average time to convergence was 59.47. As qi
grew, however, these disparities disappeared.
This suggests that while limited information can have a notable effect in slowing
down convergence times in cases of low levels of intrinsic propensities, this effect
rapidly diminishes as agents’ intrinsic propensity to stand increases.
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Figure 3: The effect of intrinsic propensity on time to convergence in the
limited vision case.
As we turn our attention to the effect of the social sensitivity parameter how-
ever, we find that limited vision has a strikingly large effect that reverses the
3For modeling simplicity, we assume that each agent counts herself as a spectator. In this
way, we avoid the issue that the model would otherwise be undefined for agents in the front
row.
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trend seen in the model of complete information (Figure 4). Whereas before,
moving σi from a low to a medium value induced significantly lower convergence
times, in the model of incomplete information, as σi increases, convergence time
also increases. Once σi > 0.5 we find particularly dramatic increases in both
convergence times and variance. Limited vision of others has a dramatic effect
on convergence, and for good reason. As the social sensitivity increases, the
effect of the intrinsic propensity diminishes. When only very few agents are in a
position to affect the behavior of others, it can easily happen that they remain
seated. This can then lead those that look to them for guidance about standing
also remain seated. This dynamic substantially dampens the bandwagon effect
that is found in the baseline model with complete information.
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Figure 4: The effect of social sensitivity on time to convergence in the limited
vision case.
2 Problems with the Baseline Model
While the baseline model helps to illuminate the basic structure of individual de-
cisions that can result in the emergence of a descriptive norm such as a standing
ovation, there are several reasons to suspect that the model is not yet adequate.
Drawing upon philosophical and empirical literature on norm compliance (Bic-
chieri 2006; Young 2009), we can levy three major criticisms at the baseline
model. We will look at each in turn.
The first way in which our model falls short is that it is not very sensitive to
a more nuanced psychology of decision-making. One thing it fails to capture is
the idea of entrenchment - people can often become set in their ways over time,
and become less and less willing to change their minds, even if social influences
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become significant. Additionally, the baseline model lumps the notion of social
sensitivity in with the notion of social contagion: it assumes that larger and
smaller groups exert the same amount of social influence over a person’s decision.
But it is likely that in some instances, small groups are sufficient for influencing
individual choices, while in others, a much larger group is necessary to change
an individual’s decision. For example, one might not need too many people to
join a small fashion trend, like wearing scarves, to start following them, but
we might expect that for other descriptive norms that are more drastic changes
from the status quo that one would want to see more people following it before
following suit.
The second way in which our model falls short is that it assumes that the amount
others can influence us is always constant across different contexts. But this is
unlikely to be the case. In instances where one has strong preferences, it is
likely that social pressure is less important. Whereas, when someone is fairly
indifferent between two actions, social pressure might be the main determinant
of that person’s choice.
The third way our model falls short is that it makes significant structural as-
sumptions about the nature of descriptive norms that may inhibit its ability to
be a useful general model. This comes in two ways. Most obviously, the model
always leads to a convergence on everyone standing. This is a highly suspect
assumption: there are many concerts in which standing ovations fail to occur,
just as there are many potential descriptive norms that never come to be. Even
still, we can expect many situations in which some, but not all, agents take on
a particular action, and for this to be stable. As it currently stands, our model
cannot capture this fact. Additionally, the model suffers from having a built-in
implicit assumption about the directionality of norms. In our baseline model,
people go from sitting to standing. It is impossible for sitting to become a norm.
Likewise, it should be possible for no norm to emerge.
In the following sections, we will present extensions to the baseline model that
will in turn seek to address these three deficiencies. What we will show is that
the qualitative results from our baseline model continue to hold as we investigate
the first two deficiencies. As we explore the structural assumptions, we will find
additional constraints on the emergence of descriptive norms that further enrich
our account.
3 The Inertia Model
In this extension, we seek to address the lack of nuance in the psychology of the
baseline model’s decision procedure. To do this, we make two changes: First,
there is a scaling factor e−αn, 0 < α < 1 such that the more rounds have passed,
the less likely it is that someone stands up. We introduce a scaling factor e−αn,
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0 < α < 1 such that the more rounds have passed (higher n) the less likely it
is that someone stands up. That is, the effective propensity of an individual to
follow the norm decreases as a function of the number of rounds. This allows us
to more carefully investigate the notion of entrenchment. Second, the propensity
to stand up as a function of the others’ behavior S(n−1)/M is taken into the βth
power, β > 0. All this can be represented by the following equation:
P
(n)
i = e
−αn
(
σi
(
S(n−1)
M
)β
+ (1− σi) qi
)
(3)
β can be thought of as a measure of contagion in the group: The smaller β
(0 < β < 1), the higher the chance that a few isolated individuals who raise
from their seats will affect the rest of the group. In other words, if we keep the
number of agents following the norm fixed, the propensity of an individual to
follow a norm is higher for smaller Beta. This reflects the fact that there are
circumstances in which it takes a few agents to trigger a conformity effect than
others. β determines the relative influence of the first agents adopting the norm
vis-a-vis those agents that adopt it at a later stage. Thus, agents with a large
β act on the basis of their propensity and the observed behavior of a crowd (as
opposed to being responsive to the behavior of individuals and small groups).
The break-even point is β = 1.
In this model, there is a nontrivial probability that not everyone stands up, even
if infinitely many rounds are played.4
Finally, it should be stressed once more that contagion and social sensitivity play
different roles: while social sensitivity balances an agent’s individual preferences
against the impact of the behavior of others, the contagion parameter determines
the rate at which the influence of an additional person standing declines with
the number of standing. If β is low the first few people standing will have a
much larger influence than the final few.5
3.1 Numerical studies
The inertia model is meant to provide a mechanism for non-complete ovations,
by providing a countervailing force on individual decision-making, encouraging
some to remain seated. This is done with a time-dependent scaling function,
which can be made more powerful by increasing the size of the inertia parameter
α. Secondly, it dampens the effect of social influence - by taking the social
4The e−αn term dominates in the long run and makes P (n)i approach zero very quickly.
5We have also explored a different extension of the model with a counter-force to the overall
conformity. This second way assumes that some people increasingly resist standing up as more
people stand. They act against the mainstream. We do not present this non-conformist model,
as we did not find a significant deviation from the baseline model, even if this condition may
be psychologically relevant.
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sensitivity component of the base model and raising it to the βth power. We
will investigate each of these modifications to the base model in turn, considering
their effect on ovation size in equilibrium.
As the model description indicated, the inertia parameter α has by far the largest
effect on ovation size. Here we will consider α with β fixed at 0.1. In general as
the inertia parameter grows, we find an exponential decay in equilibrium ovation
size. We examined values of 0.01 ≤ α ≤ 0.5 in steps of 0.01. As represented in
figure 5, we find a rapid decay in equilibrium ovation size.
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Figure 5: The effect of the inertia parameter on the number of people standing
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Figure 6: The effect of a contagion parameter on the number of people
standing
The inertia parameter controls the rate at which agents are willing to stand as
12
time goes on, which heavily dampens their ability to respond to new information
as it is revealed to them. As agents become increasingly stubborn as time goes
on, this limits their interest in standing regardless of what anyone else is doing.
We find a similar story with the contagion parameter β – since individuals
respond less to smaller groups if β is large, it is more difficult to get a bandwagon
effect initiated, even if they are increasingly sensitive to large groups. The large
groups simply cannot form if smaller groups do not have sufficient attractive
force. In this way, α and β work in concert to limit ovation size: β limits the
power of an initial small group standing, and then α increases the stubbornness
of agents sitting as the groups get slightly larger over time. This combined effect
can neuter a group’s ability to create a social bandwagon.
In the inertia model, we find that the imposition of incomplete information has
very little effect on how the active variables in the model affect ovation size. In
the case of α, we find no discernible difference between the complete information
model and the model of incomplete information. In the case of β, we find few
differences where 0 < β < 1.
4 The Endogenous Social Sensitivity Model
The baseline model and its initial extension, the inertia model, consider social
sensitivity as an exogenous parameter: It is a parameter that balances one’s
intrinsic propensity to comply with the behavioral rule with the impact of group
behavior. In other words, for an agent with high social sensitivity, the impact
of group behavior will dominate the impact of one’s individual judgment on
the quality of the concert, and vice versa. Social sensitivity does not, on that
account, depend on one’s intrinsic propensity or the number of people already
following the behavioral rule.
This view can, however, be challenged. In her book “The Grammar of Society”,
Bicchieri (2006) has shown that empirical expectations of the behavior of others
are crucial to whether descriptive norms emerge and persist. If an agent expects
a critical part of the population to follow a behavioral rule, then she will most
likely follow the rule as well. Further, an agent may only become aware of the
existence of a candidate alternative norm once it is sufficiently widespread in
the population. If a large part of the group starts to comply with the rule, the
agent reasonably expects that the behavior will spread to the entire group, and
these expectations overrule an agent’s independent preferences as a determinant
of her individual behavior. Conversely, if the percentage of individuals abiding
by the rule is lower than such a critical value, group behavior barely affects
individual behavior. Social sensitivity should thus be treated as an endogenous
variable crucially depending on the observed behavior in the group.
Both in the baseline case and the inertia extension, social sensitivity was con-
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sidered exogenous. If it is low at the outset, then it will stay low, even if the
norm spreads rapidly in the group. This delays the convergence process. It
is therefore worthwhile to investigate whether our results remain robust un-
der the feedback effects described above. To that end, we have to specify the
dependency between the variables of the original model.
We keep the baseline equation (1) intact and only write social sensitivity σ as
a function of the other variables.6 As argued above, social sensitivity should
be very low (≈ ε) if S/M is significantly below a critical value, and very high
(≈ 1) if S/M significantly exceeds that value. It is natural to assume that the
lower the intrinsic propensity q, the higher the threshold: If an agent strongly
dislikes the behavioral rule, her empirical expectations of compliance with the
rule will be higher, and the group will have to behave more homogenously in
order to meet them. Thus, we might choose
σ
(
S
M
)
=
1, if S/M≥ 1− q,ε, otherwise. (4)
Figure 7 below gives a graphic representation of the model. On the x axis is the
number of people standing up on the total audience, on the y axis the values of
sigma.
S
M
σ
1− q
ε
1
Figure 7: Discontinuous Model
When the intrinsic propensity of an individual is high her decision to stand up
is triggered by few individuals standing, whereas when it is low she needs to see
more people to follow them as well.7
6This implies that σ is time- and agent-dependent, but for reasons of simplicity, we drop
the subscripts in this exposition.
7It is, however, not clear whether real social sensitivity is as discontinuous as this equation
suggests. It seems more realistic that in many cases people have moderate individual prefer-
ence coupled with moderate social sensitivity. So we “smooth” the function by introducing an
additional parameter that governs the quickness of the transition. We did not find that this
variation had a significant difference on the final result, so we only report on the discontinuous
case, as the mathematics are more straightforward.
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4.1 Numerical Studies
In this set of simulations, we studied the effect of the intrinsic propensity on
time of convergence. We examined values of q varying from 0.01 to 1 in steps of
0.01 For simplicity of our treatment, we do not introduce the inertia and con-
tagion parameters, as we have previously examined them in isolation. Further,
as we didn’t find crucial differences between the incomplete and the complete
information case, we only present the first case. As expected, and the figure be-
low shows, we find that the time of convergence decreases for increasing values
of intrinsic propensity.
20
40
60
80
100
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
t
σ
Endogenous σ
Figure 8: The effect of the endogenous sigma on the time to convergence
5 The Symmetric Model
In our final model, we consider a generalization of our original model. As we
have previously discussed, the models we have been considering thus far all have
an implicit directionality: people start out sitting, and potentially stand. The
only descriptive norm that can emerge is one of ovation. But this assumption
limits our ability to describe the emergence of descriptive norms more generally.
As an example, consider the norm that governs how forks are used while eating.
In Europe, a fork is used in the left hand, so as to enable the eater to use a knife
in her right hand. In the United States, however, while forks are held in one’s
left hand while cutting food, they are then moved to the right hand for raising
food to one’s mouth. While either method of using forks is perfectly suitable for
consuming food in a polite and efficient manner, they are regionally segregated.
In the United States, it is rare to see the European method, and the US method
is rarely seen in Europe. What we can notice is that there is no particular
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reason to think that one method is prior to the other, so we cannot model this
as a standing ovation. So how might we provide an explanatory framework for
the emergence of norms when the potential behaviors are on equal footing?8
What we propose is a return to our baseline model (1), but with a few crucial
changes. First, we introduce two agent types, each type having a preference for
one of the two actions available to them. So type 1 agents prefer action 1, and
type 2 agents prefer action 2. Second, we re-interpret the variable 0 < q < 1,
such that 0.5 represents the indifference point, rather than 0. On this new
interpretation, 1 represents a strong preference for the action of one’s type, and
0 represents a strong preference away from this action. Third, we allow agents
to change their minds: whereas in previous models once an agent has chosen to
stand, she must remain standing, in this model agents can reverse course and
go back to their previous action. Finally, when we initialize the model, agents
are randomly (and independently) assigned an initial starting action. So, unlike
previous models, our starting state has half of the agents performing the first
action (say, the European way of using forks), and half the agents performing
the second action (like the US method of using forks). These changes allow us
to investigate several things that could not be examined in previous models. In
particular, since we are treating the two methods of using forks as symmetrical
to each other, and we allow agents to change their minds, we should expect
the models to exhibit more complex behavior. More importantly, however,
we are now able to clearly separate cases of norm emergence from behavioral
regularities, since we have differing preferences amongst agents.9
The model’s equilibrium states can be broken down into three classes: descrip-
tive norm emergence, large-scale behavioral regularities, and a mix of behaviors.
Descriptive norm emergence is found when the entire population settles on a
single action. In these cases, half of the population must be going against their
intrinsic preferences, and instead their social sensitivity drives their decision-
making. This can be contrasted against large-scale behavioral regularities, which
are cases in which all agents of one type choose the same action, but choose a
different action from agents of another type. So everyone who prefers European
fork handling employs it, and likewise everyone who prefers US fork handling
does so. In this case, we claim that individual preferences are the most pow-
erful guide to decision-making, and so social sensitivity effectively drops out of
consideration. Our final case is what is left over: a mix of influences, none of
8Young (2009) develops a model of innovation diffusion that assumes priority of one action
over another, that shares some characteristics with Schelling (1971). While this model is rather
elegant, it does not capture the possibility of equal footing for either norm, or the possibility
of no norm emerging.
9Recall that while descriptive norms rely on agents being motivated out of a desire to do
what others do, behavioral regularities are simply cases in which individuals all perform the
same action, but for independent reasons. They just all happen to prefer the same action.
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which is strong enough to completely guide behavior. In these cases, both pref-
erences and social sensitivity are at work, neither of which is sufficiently strong
to overpower the other. So we find an unsystematic mix of behaviors.
Let us now turn to a numerical analysis of this model.
5.1 Numerical Studies
This model requires a different approach to our analysis. Rather than consider
something like time to convergence, we must instead consider the probabilities
of settling into the three different states for the different values of intrinsic
preference and social sensitivity. The initial state is shown in the figure below,
as it appears in the Netlogo interface. The grid represents the theatre audience,
composed by two agent types: squares are agents who prefer standing and circles
are agents who prefer sitting. White squares stay for those agents who perform
their preferred action, in this case standing, otherwise they are black. Black
circles stay for those agents who perform their preferred action, namely sitting,
otherwise they are white.
Figure 9: Symmetric Model’s Initial State
In the set of simulations for the symmetric model we examined the probability
for a norm to emerge according the distributions of social sensitivity and intrinsic
propensity between the audience. The norm emergence corresponds to a state
in which all agents in the audience perform the same action, regardless of their
intrinsic propensity. Graphically (figure 10), this happens when all circles and
squares are white (or when all circles and squares are black).
What we found was that the emergence of full descriptive norms is quite rare.
Figure 11 represents the probability of descriptive norms emergence for increas-
ing values of intrinsic propensity. Each curves corresponds to fixed values of
social sensitivity. We can see that this probability increases as the agents be-
come indifferent between the two actions (q ' 0.5) and in general for higher
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Figure 10: Full Norm
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Figure 11: The probability of descriptive norms emergence
values of social sensitivity.
More common are large-scale behavioral regularities. These occur when agents
perform their favorite action, e.g. when all squares are standing and all circles
are sitting. These outcomes can happen for wider ranges of social sensitivity,
so long as the intrinsic preference is more extreme in value. Figure 13 shows
that the probability of behavioral regularities is lower for intermediate values of
intrinsic propensity and for lower values of social sensitivity.
Most common of all, however, are mixed outcomes, those in which some of the
agents perform their preferred outcome and others don’t (graphically, this corre-
spond to a situation similar to the initial state but with a different distribution
of colors, according to those circles and square that modified their initial state).
This result seems to comport well with the real world: though descriptive norms
are quite common and are found in a very wide variety of social situations, there
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Figure 12: Behavioral Regularities
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Figure 13: The probability of behavioral regularities emergence
are many more possible descriptive norms than there are actual descriptive
norms. Most of our day to day behaviors are not norm-governed, even though
many are.
6 Conclusions
We have argued that a model of standing ovations can provide a useful frame-
work for the investigation of the emergence of descriptive norms. While we do
not claim that all descriptive norms have the character of standing ovations, we
have tried to suggest that with a few modifications, we can transform a model
of standing ovations into a general model of the emergence of descriptive norms.
In particular, we wish to stress the qualitative match of results across the vari-
ous models we present. The baseline, inertia, and endogenous social sensitivity
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models all explore the convergence dynamics of a ‘directed’ transition from one
behavior to another. Though they build in substantively different psychological
assumptions about the agents involved, we find that these large perturbations
do not shift us far away from our original baseline results.
While descriptive norms themselves most often are not fully captured by the
baseline model, it can often be the case that these sorts of directed transitions
can describe the propagation of information about the social context for behav-
iors. For example, Christians remove hats in Church to show proper deference,
but not at sporting events. When they enter a novel environment, for which
they may or may not have to signal deference – say, going into a classroom or
a museum for the first time – they may look to others for signals of what they
should do. When we enter into a novel situation, we may not be sure which of
our already-established norms ought to govern our behavior. A directed transi-
tion model, like a standing ovation, might be a good representation of this sort
of phenomenon.
The final model we consider, we contend, does capture the essential elements of
the emergence of descriptive norms, given that it is possible for any behavioral
rule, or none at all, to emerge as a norm. What is so striking about this last
model is that it is only a minor modification of the original baseline model, but
provides a dynamic that displays the relevant considerations for the potential
emergence of a descriptive norm. We did not do anything to change the fun-
damental decision procedure – we simply allowed people to change their minds,
and have preferences for more than one action. But with these small changes,
we generalized the model, and enabled ourselves to discuss a much larger class
of social phenomena.
This kind of modeling offers some insights into the nature of descriptive norms
that might be difficult to arrive at otherwise. In particular, what we find,
especially by studying our symmetric model, is that whether a norm emerges
at all, let alone which norm it is, is remarkably contingent on factors that have
nothing to do with the substance of the norm itself. Whether it is table manners
or audience behaviors, or even how we dress, we do not follow them because they
are somehow superior to their alternatives, but rather we follow them because a
mix of social and personal factors happened to nudge us in one direction rather
than the other. We often place value in these norms, but we should avoid making
the mistake that this value comes from the action itself. Rather, we can see the
value of an action coming from the fact that we have become accustomed to
doing it.
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